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For decades, lawyers' bilateral negotiations, rather than trials, have
resolved a majority of the civil actions filed in courts in the U.S.'
Increasingly, lawyers and clients now conduct these negotiations within
1. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004);
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1919, 1954-55
(2009) (using Administrative Office data to calculate an approximate 67.7% settlement
rate for federal civil cases terminated in 2005); Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?,
2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 7 (2006) ("When the federal rules of civil procedure were enacted in
1938, about 18 percent of civil cases in federal court were resolved by trial. That figure
fell to about 12 percent in 1962 and today it is 1.7 percent."); Gillian Hadfield, Where
Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts
in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705,
730-733 (2004) (suggesting that with various coding and statistical corrections to the
Federal Judicial Center's Integrated Data Base for 1970-2000, the rate of settlement was
68.7% in 2000 and 66.6% in 1970 for contested terminations); Hope Viner Sambom, The
Vanishing Trial: More and More Cases are Settled, Mediated or Arbitrated without a
Public Resolution. Will the Trend Harm the Justice System?, 88-OCT A.B.A. J. 24, 27
(2002) ("Still, many judges and lawyers view the drop in jury trials as a positive sign.
They say that ADR is working and that litigants are settling cases for fair sums without
spending exorbitant amounts of money."); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle ": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1340
(1994) (suggesting that two-thirds of cases settle with a judicial ruling).
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court-encouraged or court-mandated mediation.2 Some commentators
decry these developments,3 while others argue that the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure always intended to provide disputants
with the tools needed to investigate and then resolve their own disputes.4
From the latter perspective, a self-sufficient and democratic people (and
the legal profession that has developed to serve them5) should be
2. See Nancy A. Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 487 (Moffitt et. al. ed., 2005) (discussion of the
increased use of mediation within the courts and the effects institutionalization has had
on mediation); Dorothy J. Della Noce et. al., Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinnings of
Mediation: Implications for Practice and Policy, 3 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 39, 40 (2002)
("Court-connected mediation programs are increasing, as courts look to mediation to
control their dockets and increase the public's satisfaction with the judicial system.");
Roselle L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Leading Horses to Water: The Impact of an ADR
"Confer and Report" Rule, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 253 (2005); Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L.
Wissler, Finding Out if it is True: Comparing Mediation and Negotiation Through
Research, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 131 (2002) ("[C]ourt-based mediation programs for civil
cases have expanded significantly over the last fifteen years .... .").
3. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing
ADR should not be allowed because parties are often coerced to settle and absence of
judicial involvement raises various concerns); Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1045, 1549-50 (1991) (opposing mandatory
family mediation because it requires parties to interact in forced setting, women often feel
obliged to maintain connection with ex-partner during process, and it is potentially
destructive because parties were once involved in intimate relationship); Richard Delgado
et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1387-88, 1391 (1985) (stating ADR does little to
counter historical and subconscious prejudice, and arguing judicial system should be used
to encourage fairness and deter prejudice because such systems are formal, subject to
more control, and can reduce prejudice); see also Howard M. Erichson, Against
Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1117 (2009); Eric Yamamoto,
ADR: Where Have All the Critics Gone? 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055 (2006); see also
Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons
from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 425 (2004-
2005) (counseling deliberation and care in institutionalizing mediation so that it assists
courts in achieving substantive, procedural and efficient justice and providing appropriate
forums); but see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Settlement Is It Anyway? A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663
(1995).
4. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid
For, and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 943, 950-51(2004) ("Discovery produces a great deal of information, some about
one's own case and almost as much about the other side's case. It is not surprising that
such information will sometimes produce converging estimates of the likely outcome of
the trial.... On the basis of this information the parties will often settle. That point is
important: modem discovery itself produces settlements, regardless of the judge's
behavior or the availability of devices like early neutral evaluation and settlement
conferences. Comparative data again illuminate, suggesting that civil-law systems-in
which parties cannot force discovery-have trial rates ranging between 30-70 percent
higher than those in any U.S. jurisdiction.").
5. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 28 (2nd ed. 1994) (1982); but see RONIT DINOVITZER, ET AL.,
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expected to take the initiative to identify alleged harms, communicate
with each other, listen to each other's perspective, review necessary
information, and ultimately attempt to reach customized solutions before
turning to expensive and intrusive public resources-i.e., judges and
juries-for decisions enforceable by the state.6
In fact, empirical research has demonstrated repeatedly that
allegedly litigious Americans overwhelmingly attempt to resolve their
disputes privately before turning to the courts for help.7 Meanwhile,
increasing numbers of institutions in the public and private sectors now
incorporate explicit, formalized opportunities for communication and
evaluation to resolve disputes with employees, customers, citizens and
vendors. These in-house innovations are occurring with sufficient
frequency that the discipline of "dispute system design" has emerged,
with a dispute system defined as "one or more internal processes that
have been adopted to prevent, manage or resolve a stream of disputes
connected to an organization or institution."8 The dispute systems that
include consensual procedures-i.e., communication, negotiation,
mediation, non-binding evaluations, ombudspersons-have been found
effective in resolving many of the disputes that institutions inevitably
confront and, over time, can even improve business and workplace
relationships. Obviously, successful resolution of disputes through these
procedures also permits the parties to avoid accessing our public justice
system.
AFTER THE J.D.: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 19 (2004);
Nancy Welsh, Looking Down the Road Less Traveled: Challenges to Persuading the
Legal Profession to Define Problems More Humanistically, 2008 J. DiSp. RESOL. 45
("Increasingly, too, profit-maximizing considerations have led segments of legal practice
to emulate corporate employment, making one-on-one, personal interaction with real,
individual clients less likely and thus humanistic practice less attainable . . . . The goal of
feeling like a lawyer who will be called upon to assist clients with human, moral
dilemmas appears particularly difficult to achieve for new lawyers in the mega-firms,
with 100 or more lawyers in a single office. Though only 18% of new lawyers and 8% of
all lawyers actually work in this practice setting, the money is best at these firms, and
they dominate many law students' and law schools' aspirations."); Mark J. Osiel, Book
Review: Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L. REv.
2009, 2039 (1990) ("In sum, a first step toward improving Abel's theoretical account
would be to note that the natural temperament of lawyers might better be characterized
not as that of monopolists but of heliotropes: gravitating to the sources of power and
privilege within society and occasionally employing monopoly to further that end.").
6. Note the irony here of the ease with which arbitral awards are transformed into
judgments and thus enforceable.
7. See Section II, infra.
8. Stephanie Smith & Jan Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems
Design, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 123, 126 (2009); see also Lisa Blomgren Bingham,
Susan Summers Raines, Timothy Hedeen, & Lisa Marie Napoli, Mediation in
Employment and Creeping Legalism: Implications for Dispute System Design (Oct. 9,
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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The success, likelihood and character of formalized consensual
procedures, however, must be understood as operating within the shadow
of the "default" procedures offered by normal, private life on one hand
and those required by public courts (and agencies) on the other hand. It
is fairly straightforward to appreciate that the ubiquity and success of
"settlement on the courthouse steps" has always been a by-product of the
threat of an impending trial. Rational individuals and organizations
generally make concessions in negotiation (and now, presumably, in
mediation) because such concessions make sense.9 The negotiators
either anticipate a meaningful gain as a result of a negotiated outcome or
fear the loss they may suffer if they refuse to reach an agreement. The
more powerful of these two motivators, it turns out, is the fear of loss,o
and such fear has long motivated settlements.
9. But not always. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of
Fairness Considerations and Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 98-100 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (noting
that the existence of a negative relationship can lead negotiators to focus on ensuring that
they do better than the other negotiator, even though they incur risk in pursuing this
goal); Arnold H. Rutkin et. al., Family Law and Practice: General Tactical
Consideration, 8A CONN. PRAC., FAMILY LAW & PRAC. § 49.2 (2d ed.) ("If the client is
intent upon assigning blame, seeking revenge or inflicting punishment, he or she may not
be in favor of a course of action which seems to involve declaring a truce or working
with 'the enemy.' Apart from the reluctance to even enter into negotiations, such a client
may be initially unwilling to agree to terms which are reasonable enough for realistic
inclusion in a separation agreement."); RAOUL FELDER, BARE-KNUCKLE NEGOTIATION:
SAVVY TIPS AND TRUE STORIES FROM THE MASTER OF GIVE-AND-TAKE 71 (2004) ("Even
with the new no-fault divorce system, clients still want to hire a lawyer to be an
instrument of revenge. Some clients have less interest in obtaining the most money from
a settlement than in destroying the other party in a final and rancorous battle to the
end."); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, The Civil Trial: Adaption and Alternatives:
Symposium Article: Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation:
Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1275, 1315 (2005) ("Intraorganizational cases are
significantly more likely to settle (five to ten percentage points) than cases brought by
individual plaintiffs. And organizations suing individuals are significantly more likely to
settle than when the positions are reversed."); Amy Cohen, Dispute Systems Design,
Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 51 (2009)
(cautioning that dispute resolution system designers need to acknowledge that for a
variety of reasons, institutions do not make decisions or behave in a manner that is
identical to individual persons).
10. See Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence
in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Does the
Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 765, 789 ("Loss aversion is a finding that individuals fear losses, indeed they fear
losses roughly twice as much as they enjoy gains."); Thomas Lee Hazen, Public Policy:
Rational Investments, Speculation or Gamble?-Derivatives Securities and Financial
Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 987,
1001 (1992) ("This has been explained in psychological terms by the phenomenon that
the pain of a loss looms twice as large as the pleasure of an equivalent gain.").
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Perhaps less obviously, public and private institutions' decisions to
adopt internal, consensual procedures, along with the character and
success of these procedures, are similarly influenced by the desire to
avoid the financial and reputational costs of civil litigation" and to
improve the chance of winning in the event that litigation is
unavoidable. 12  In other words, court-connected negotiation and
mediation and the consensual components of agencies' and companies'
internal dispute systems do not work simply because they are magic or
"nice." They work, and have been introduced, due in significant part to
the viability of an alternative procedure that is perceived as
uncontrollably risky-i.e., today's civil lawsuit, with its costly and
revealing threats of discovery and public trial before a judge or jury.'" In
the U.S., therefore, negotiation, mediation and other consensual dispute
resolution procedures-whether offered by courts, agencies or private
institutions-should be understood as component parts of both the
private "risk management" system and our public "justice" system. 14
These consensual procedures have been institutionalized because they
help to manage the risk of significant disruption to the status quo. They
11. See John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives
Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 137, 178 (2000) ("Compared with the
attorneys, executives are much more satisfied with ADR than litigation. As there is no
significant difference between the three groups' evaluations of ADR, the difference in
relative evaluations is a reflection of executives' greater distaste for litigation than greater
absolute satisfaction with ADR.").
12. See Hadfield, The Civil Trial, supra note 9, at 1315.
13. Geert Hofstede has handily illustrated how the introduction of external forces
may work to change a culture that would otherwise be characterized by behaviors and
values that reflect and reinforce each other. Participation in civil litigation may represent
such an external force. Uncontrolled technology-e.g., YouTube and the posting of
unedited videos-may represent another such a force. See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S
CONSEQUENCES COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS
ACROSS NATIONS 12 (2nd ed. 2001).
14. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic
Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 142 (2004) (urging mediation
advocates "to help our courts overcome their current problems and regain an appropriate
measure of self-respect for their unique role in enabling a democratic people to govern
themselves" and a "symbiotic relationship" between the courts and ADR); Nancy A.
Welsh, One American Law Professor's View of the Future of Mediation in The
Netherlands Slide Presentation (June 29-30, 2006) (on file with author); see also Richard
C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000) (suggesting the intersection of a
public justice system and a private alternative dispute resolution system); Bruce E.
Meyerson, The Dispute Resolution Profession Should Not Celebrate The Vanishing Trial,
7 CARDozo J. CONFLICT RESOL. 77 (2005) (urging that mediators and arbitrators need to
work to improve the quality of the justice system); John Lande, How Much Justice Can
We Afford? Defining the Courts' Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials,
Settlement Signals, and Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DiSP.
RESOL. 213 (2006).
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achieve this through their provision of individualized resolution and their
ability to offer a sufficient experience of procedural and substantive
justice.
The extent of the relationship between the private risk management
system and the public justice system, however, is subject to change. The
systems may appear to overlap significantly or operate almost
autonomously. A key factor is the ease with which relatively powerless
plaintiffs can escape the private system and gain access to the public
system. Such access has been quite liberal since 1938, when notice
pleading was institutionalized in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures.
With Conley v. Gibson,15 the U.S. Supreme Court provided an important
and expansive affirmation of notice pleading, which will be discussed in
some detail infra.
Notice pleading certainly has its problems. It can encourage a
variety of ills: frivolous lawsuits, coercion by powerful plaintiffs,
careless lawyering, abuse of judicial time and resources. But notice
pleading also helps to make real the promise of "room in [the courts] for
those who have relied and must continue to rely on the hospitality of the
courts for vindication of their rights."' 6  Unpopular, marginalized,
underfunded and individual plaintiffs-like the four African-American
union members who were expected to remain silent as their jobs
disappeared but who chose instead to bring the lawsuit that led to Conley
v. Gibson-are certainly among those who have relied on such
hospitality.17
Imagine now, though, that you are in a different role. You are an
institutional defendant, who faces a potential suit brought by just the sort
of plaintiff who must access the courts in order to achieve vindication.
What if you know that you can find out very quickly whether you must
deal with this plaintiffs threats of discovery and public trial, even before
you are required to file an answer, make the initial disclosures required
by Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or permit wide-
ranging discovery? And what if you also know that the court is likely to
share your worldview and thus will likely dismiss this plaintiffs action
15. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
16. THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 91 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler, eds., 1979) (quoted in McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 4,
at 432).
17. Importantly, however, others have noted that monied, commercial interests also
have turned to the courts to ensure enforcement of their generally-contractual rights. See
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET.AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 85
(Aspen Publishers, 3rd ed. 2008) (regarding Judge Clark's mixed motives in introducing
notice pleading).
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before she has a chance to tell her (possibly dramatic and heart-
wrenching) story? Now, would you offer to engage in pre-litigation
negotiation or mediation with such a plaintiff? Perhaps you would if you
were concerned about this plaintiffs ability to disrupt your workplace or
community' 8 or felt some individualized moral obligation to deal with
people regardless of their status or popularity. 9
In general, however, I fear that a coldly rational institutional
defendant would not make the offer to negotiate and would not respond
favorably to such a request from this sort of plaintiff.20 Negotiation
under these circumstances would represent a waste of the time, money
and effort that could be allocated more productively elsewhere-and the
negotiation itself could prolong a conflict that might otherwise dissipate.
In fact, this is just the sort of assessment made by many institutional
repeat players already, particularly those that have not initiated pre-
litigation dispute systems that include negotiation, mediation or other
forms of consensual dispute resolution.2' If they are not required to
listen to and negotiate with marginalized claimants, many will not do so.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 2 and Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly23 have the potential to exacerbate this trend and even
encourage the dismantling of the dispute resolution initiatives already
undertaken by public and private institutions.24 With Iqbal and
18. Such power suggests, however, that this plaintiff would not fit the definition of
"marginalized."
19. See Jonathan R. Cohen, When People are the Means: Negotiating with Respect,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 791 (2001) (pointing out that when lawyers have a
responsibility to act zealously in favor of their client, they do not violate any rules if in
doing so they maintain their obligation to treat all the persons involved in the legal
process with consideration).
20. But see Ellen Dannin, Michelle Dean & Gangaram Singh, Law Reform,
Collective Bargaining, and the Balance ofPower, 11 WORKING USA 219 (2008) (finding
that the bargaining power of union and management have been affected, to the detriment
of unions, by judicial interpretations of the NLRA that permit employers' replacement of
strikers and implementation of the employer's last best offer upon the occurrence of
impasse in collective bargaining negotiations-but that negotiations still occur); Michael
Moffitt, Iqbal and Settlement (manuscript on file with author) (using economic models to
predict that settlement will decrease as a result of Iqbal but also noting that "predictions
against the wave of settlement have been fools' bets over the last half century").
21. See Margaret M. Clark, While some employers see no incentive for EEO
mediation, others find benefits-HR News, HR MAGAZINE, Jan. 2004, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m3495/is-1_49/ai_112799809/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2010) ("The EEO contracted with Professor E. Patrick McDermott and colleagues at the
Perdue School of Business at Salisbury State University to find out why only about 30
percent of employers agree to mediate as opposed to about 80 percent of charging
parties.").
22. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
23. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
24. And my concern about this likely future has only grown after the Supreme
Court's even more-recent decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission,
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Twombly, the Supreme Court may be intentionally or unintentionally
"throwing the fight," 25 at least in the legal contests between many civil
rights claimants and institutional defendants. The most obvious feared
effect is reduction of civil rights claimants' access to the expressive and
coercive power of the courts.26 Less obviously, the Supreme Court may
be effectively undermining institutions' motivation to negotiate,
mediate-or even communicate with and listen to-such claimants.
Thus, the Supreme Court's recent decisions have the potential to deprive
marginalized claimants-and our society-of alternative, effective
avenues for the airing and resolution of disputes with powerful
institutional players.
Ironically, it was just this sort of deprivation that led the Supreme
Court to announce its expansive vision of notice pleading in Conley v.
Gibson. Conley foretells the need for our courts to maintain a robust
public forum for those who are marginalized by the default procedures of
normal life-not only to provide redress to the parties directly involved
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), to permit corporations to pour apparently limitless funds into
election campaigns. Many state judges, after all, are elected-and it is elected legislators
who appoint the remaining state and federal judges.
25. ON THE WATERFRONT (Columbia Pictures 1954) (in reference to a conversation
between the Malloy brothers, Terry and Charley, in which Charley tells Terry his
misfortune in boxing is because of Terry's manager. Terry then confronts his brother and
tells him it was Charley's fault that he didn't make it far in boxing because he had asked
him to throw a key fight: "It wasn't him, Charley, it was you. Remember that night in the
Garden you came down to my dressing room and you said, 'Kid, this ain't your night.
We're going for the price on Wilson.' You remember that? 'This ain't your night'! My
night! I coulda taken Wilson apart! So what happens? He gets the title shot outdoors on
the ballpark and what do I get? A one-way ticket to Palooka-ville! You was my brother,
Charley, you shoulda looked out for me a little bit. You shoulda taken care of me just a
little bit so I wouldn't have to take them dives for the short-end money." The scene
culminates with Terry telling Charley the most famous line in the film: "You don't
understand. I coulda had class. I coulda been a contender. I coulda been somebody,
instead of a bum, which is what I am, let's face it. It was you, Charley." Terry goes on
to fight outside the ring-defying corrupt union officials and ultimately winning his co-
workers' respect and support.).
26. See Victor C. Romero, Interrogating Iqbal: Intent, Inertia, and a (lack of)
Imagination, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1419 (2010) (observing how purportedly neutral rules
or criteria ultimately seem to favor dominant members of society); Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Business As Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1485; Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal's Entrenchment of
Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1443
(2010); but see Lee H. Rosenthal, Pleading, for the Future: Conversations After Iqbal,
114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1537 (2010) (indicating that statistics show no increase in the
dismissal of civil rights claims after Iqbal, though there has been some increase in the
number of dismissals in contract cases); Mark R. Brown, Qualified Immunity and
Interlocutory Fact-Finding in the Courts of Appeals, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1317 (2010)
(suggesting that Iqbal has not really changed anything for lawyers representing civil
rights claimants because they already know that they need to engage in fact pleading due
to many courts' defacto heightened pleading requirements in that context).
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in particular disputes but because the viability of such a forum has the
indirect and salutary effect of forcing institutional players to find a way
to sufficiently approximate the fair dialogue and resolution modeled in
our courts.27 Professor Isabelle Gunning has summed up this challenge
(and promise) quite beautifully, observing that in our still-young
democracy, marginalized individuals "need, even more so than
advantaged group members, a forum in which their authentic voices and
experiences can be expressed" and that private, consensual forums that
permit such expression can offer "another locus in American political,
social and legal life where ideas about equality are defined and
redefined."2 8
In an attempt to acknowledge legitimate concerns regarding the
inefficiency and costs of today's civil litigation process in some cases,
while still protecting the courts' essential role in providing a forum for
marginalized parties, this Article will suggest that courts take a second
look at the summary jury trial, a dispute resolution process that has fallen
into some disuse. The summary jury trial is an expedited form of trial
conducted before an advisory jury and followed by negotiation or
mediation between the parties and their lawyers. Relatively early and
appropriate use of this process could effectively prompt resolution and
dialogue-i.e., private dialogue between the parties before the process is
to occur; a stylized form of public dialogue during the trial phase of the
process itself; and another private dialogue, potentially with assistance
from a judge or mediator, after the advisory jury has been dismissed.
27. See McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 3, at 402 (noting that
in the published proceedings of the 1976 Pound Conference, three former ABA
presidents advocated reform of civil litigation because American citizens had too much
desire for the "respectful attention and thoughtful consideration that they do not think
they get anywhere else") (quoting THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 11); see also
Andrea Schneider, Bargaining in the Shadow of (International) Law: What the
Normalization of Adjudication in International Governance Regimes Means for Dispute
Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 789, 818 (2009) ("For international disputes,
particularly those dealing with transitional justice, the rule of law must first be
established in courts before the values of procedural justice can be realized in consensual
processes"); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, et al., Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial:
Comparing Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 225, 259 (2009) (concluding, based on empirical study, that "parties in ADR and
litigation cases request, and are granted, about the same amount of relief').
28. Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative
Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DIsP. RESOL. 55, 67 (1995) (cited in Nancy A. Welsh,
Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social
Justice Theory, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 56-57 (2004); see also The Future of Mediation:
Court-Connected Mediation in the US. and The Netherlands Compared, 1 FORUM VOOR
CONFLICTMANAGEMENT 19, 22 (2007) (observing that Dutch citizens may choose, and the
Netherlands provides financial support for, several different "paths to justice").
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This Article will begin with Conley v. Gibson and its history, which
demonstrates the connection between access to the expressive and
coercive power of the courts on one hand and the likelihood and
character of pre-litigation negotiation on the other hand. The Article will
then review research that reveals the "default" procedures of normal life
and consider briefly the procedures currently offered by the courts that
are designed to counter these default procedures and provide otherwise-
marginalized one-shot players with access to information and the courts'
expressive and coercive powers. The Article will then turn to the
consensual dispute resolution procedures that have been adopted by
courts, agencies and private companies to resolve disputes and consider
the extent to which such procedures reflect the default procedures of both
normal life and civil litigation. This Article will then suggest the effect
of Iqbal and Twombly on the likelihood, timing and character of
negotiation, mediation and other consensual forms of dispute resolution
in contests between marginalized one-shot parties and institutional repeat
players. Finally, the Article will propose adaptation of the summary jury
trial as a response to the excesses of civil litigation and as a means to
continue the courts' role in encouraging and modeling pre-litigation
negotiation and resolution.
I. CONLEY AS NEEDED ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRE-LITIGATION
COMMUNICATION AND NEGOTIATION
Every first-year law student knows that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, adopted in 1938, ushered in the era of notice pleading. As
Judge Charles Clark, the principal draftsman of the Rules and
subsequently a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, observed in the 1944 case of Dioguardi v. Durning,29 the new
Rule 8(a) intentionally did not require pleadings to "stat[e] 'facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action,' but only that there be 'a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."' 30 Judge Clark used this interpretation of Rule 8(a) to find that a
nearly-unintelligible complaint, drafted by an Italian immigrant who had
refused the assistance of legal counsel, could be understood to state a
claim. In Conley v. Gibson,31 a case involving four African-Americans
who claimed that their union had violated its duty of providing fair
representation by refusing to consider the concerns they had raised
following their employer's abolition of their jobs, the U.S. Supreme
Court further cemented the liberality of the standard by explaining that
29. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
30. Id. at 775.
31. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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"all the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."32 The Court's opinion went on:
The illustrative forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this.
Such simplified "notice pleading" is made possible by the liberal
opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both
claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and
issues.... The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.3 3
In addition, of course, Conley has long been known for the apparently
unconditional embrace of notice pleading described by the Court as an
"accepted rule." Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice Black explained
that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."34
This language must be understood in context. The petitioners were
four African-American members of the Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees
("the Brotherhood"), suing on behalf of themselves and other African
American members similarly situated. The respondents were the
Brotherhood and the American Federation of Labor, their Local Unions
6051 and 28, and the locals' chairmen. According to allegations in the
complaint: the Brotherhood had been named the exclusive bargaining
representative for petitioners; petitioners were required to be members of
32. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 47, 48 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 45, 46 (emphasis added). Professor Emily Sherwin has written a very
helpful history of Conley v. Gibson in The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in
CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIEs 281 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004). She notes that Justice
Black nearly quoted, but without attribution, from James Moore's influential treatise, the
second edition of Moore's Federal Practice which stated that a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim "should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the
plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of his claim" and that Moore was the prot6g6 of Judge Clark. Id. at 287, 302; see
also Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble With Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1011, 1021 (2009) (observing
that "after Conley and Swierkiewicz it was fairly clear that an employment discrimination
plaintiff need only provide a basic statement of the claim in order to proceed during the
early stages of the case. There was still some ambiguity in the Court's pronouncement of
the proper standard, but, for the most part, it would cause difficulty only for those cases
in the margins. The typical employment discrimination plaintiff knew what must be
alleged to survive a motion to dismiss.")
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the Brotherhood as a condition of employment; and the Brotherhood had
established segregated-and unequal-local lodges. Local 28 was
composed entirely of white employees; African-American employees
were members of Local 6051. Beginning with the ominous observation
that "[o]nce again" African-American employees were before the courts
to request judicial assistance in compelling unions to "represent them
fairly[,]"35 Justice Black went on to recount the petitioners' allegations as
follows:
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad
at its Houston Freight House. Local 28 of the Brotherhood was the
designated bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act for the
bargaining unit to which petitioners belonged. A contract existed
between the Union and the Railroad which gave the employees in the
bargaining unit certain protection from discharge and loss of
seniority. In May, 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs
held by petitioners or other Negroes all of whom were either
discharged or demoted. In truth the 45 jobs were not abolished at all
but instead filled by whites as the Negroes were ousted, except for a
few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their old jobs but
with loss of seniority. Despite repeated pleas by petitioners, the
Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to protect them against
these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection
comparable to that given to white employees. The complaint then
went on to allege that the Union had failed in general to represent
Negro employees equally and in good faith. It charged that such
discrimination constituted a violation of petitioners' right under the
Railw Labor Act to fair representation from their bargaining
agent.
The Railroad's announcement of the abolition of the African-American
employees' jobs followed the Railroad's decision to lease certain
portions of the docks at the Houston Freight House to another company,
the Southern Pacific Transport Company ("Transport Company"). The
Brotherhood did not provide any advance notice to affected employees
regarding the abolition of their jobs. Union officials did assert,
however, that "nothing could be done about it."38 This assertion would
have rung true if the Railroad faced a business necessity and had been
forced to lease its docks to an unrelated third party. Suspiciously,
35. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42.
36. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43-45 (emphasis added).
37. See Complaint at No. VIII. But see Brief for Respondents at 8, 28, Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
38. See Complaint at No. VIII; Brief for Respondents at 8, 28.
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however, the Transport Company was a subsidiary of the Railroad.39
The African-American employees complained to the Brotherhood, but
the Brotherhood refused even to "consider'" 0 their grievances. Rather,
the Brotherhood "'suffered [the discharges] to occur without in any
manner coming to the aid of the plaintiffs ... and did decline to hear
plaintiffs on this question of discharging repeatedly and without
reason."Al
I have highlighted particular language in the previous two
paragraphs because the dynamic described here relates to the general
theme of this Article. The affected African-American employees
apparently sought to be heard by their union, seeking its assistance in
being heard by their employer (which, apparently, had previously refused
to listen to all of its workers and thus triggered their unionization). The
employees thus sought to communicate and negotiate internally, before
turning to an outsider, the court. The Brotherhood, however, refused to
hear and did nothing to respond to these employees' pleas. Why would
the Brotherhood behave in this manner? The following answer appears
quite "plausible": because neither the Brotherhood nor the Railroad had
perceived listening and responding to these less-powerful, marginalized
individuals as in their interests, and they were not going to listen and
respond until someone more powerful forced them to do so. 42
39. See Complaint at No. IX; see also Sherwin, supra note 34, at 295.
40. Poignantly, in their complaint, the petitioners sought "the right to have all
legitimate grievances considered by the union and the right to be treated by said union
with the utmost candor, fairness, and straight forwardness [sic]." Complaint, No. I,
available at http://legall.cit.comell.edu/kevin/civprostories/chap07/conley01.pdf.
41. Id. at No. VIII (also cited in Sherwin, supra note 34, at 295 (quoting from
Transcript of Record at 11) (emphasis added).
42. See Sherwin, supra note 34, at 303 (describing the state of the law regarding
employment discrimination claims and pointing out that the Civil Rights Act had not yet
been passed, few states had fair employment laws, and actions by private employers were
not generally considered to meet the requirement of state action for application of the
Fourteenth Amendment (citing to MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN &
REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 636
(6th ed. 2003); Archibald Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151,
156 (1957); Michael I. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial
Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 563, 563-65 (1962)); see also Ellen Dannin &
Gangaram Singh, More Than Just a Cool T-Shirt: What We Don't Know About Collective
Bargaining-But Should-To Make Organizing Effective, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
93 (2007) ("Workers do not join unions just to be members or to get cool t-shirts and sing
"Solidarity Forever." Workers join unions because they want what unions can get
them-better pay, just cause employment, respect, and a say in workplace conditions.
Organizing alone cannot get these things. Organizing is only a vehicle that leads to the
collective bargaining power that wins workplace rights . . . . Through collective
bargaining, workers can earn more money, have greater job security, exercise greater
control over their jobs, and create a community that supports one another. The National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) itself recognizes organizing and joining unions as important
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This was not a new dynamic in the railroad industry in particular or
in labor-management relations more generally. Decades earlier,
Congress had passed the Railway Labor Act 4 3 (RLA) to grant railroad
workers a rather constricted right to unionize. In 1934, Congress
amended the RLA to create an administrative agency, the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, to resolve claims of discriminatory
administration of contracts.44 The Board was composed of labor and
management delegates. This composition would seem to ensure
appropriate checks and balances in labor-management relationS45
unless labor and management found common cause in the
appropriateness of discriminating against a particular, marginalized
group of workers. This is exactly what African-American union
members and their lawyers perceived as occurring, as they were forced
by law and contract to seek redress in yet another inhospitable forum.
Therefore, they had sought-and were winning-access to the
federal courts. In the process, as Professor Emily Sherwin has observed,
their "narrative [had] beg[u]n to unfold," and judges had felt "pressure to
solve the human problems that appear[ed], even when no solution [was]
available under established rules of law."4 6 If employers, school
officials, unions, administrative adjudicators, state legislators, state
governors, Congress, and even the President refused to hear,
acknowledge and respond to these marginalized parties, the federal
courts would at the very least offer them a meaningful opportunity to tell
their stories, express their concerns and receive dignified, even-handed
consideration of their claims. 4 7 And by 1954, the year that the African-
because they lead to collective bargaining and create the power necessary to secure
improved wages and working conditions and promote economic security.").
43. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1926); see also Lisa Catherine Tulk, The 1926 Railway Labor
Act and the Modern American Airline Industry: Changes and "Chaos" Outline the Need
for Revised Legislation, 69 J. AIR & CoM 615, 617 (2004).
44. See Lloyd K. Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique
Administrative Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
45. See Michael S. Maza, Arbitrator Selection and Neutrality Under the Railway
Labor Act: An Airline Employee's Perspective, 4 J. OF AM. ARB. 327 (2005) (describing
Northwest Airline's system for the arbitration of airline pilots' grievances).
46. Sherwin, supra note 34, at 305; see also JAN B.M. VRANKEN, EXPLORING THE
JURIST'S FRAME OF MIND: CONSTRAINTS AND PRECONCEPTIONS IN CIVIL LAW
ARGUMENTATION 104-06 (2006) (urging the greater suitability of mediation for cases in
which courts cannot "protect" an important emotional interest with judicial remedies or a
party's legal claim does not represent her real interest).
47. Note that these are all meaningful characteristics of those processes that have
been found to provide "procedural justice." See Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of
Fairness in Negotiation, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 165, 169 (Andrea K.
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006) ("First, people are more likely to judge
a process as fair if they are given meaningful opportunity to tell their story (i.e., an
opportunity for voice. Second, in a process that feels fair, people receive assurance that
the decisionmaker has listened to them and understood and cared about what they had to
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American employees in Conley brought their action, the Supreme Court
had signaled its willingness to respond to the plight of African-
Americans suffering discrimination in employment48 as well as
education.49
In order to be heard by the federal courts regarding their grievance-
related claim against the Brotherhood, however, the African-American
employees in Conley had to frame the union's alleged inaction as a
violation of its obligation to represent all employees within their
bargaining unit "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in
good faith" 50-a standard that had been established by Supreme Court in
the collective bargaining context. Though the petition for a writ for
certiorari referenced only "acts and omissions,"' the petitioner's brief
went into some detail regarding the allegations that demonstrated the
union's "hostile discrimination":
[S]olely because of their race, the union bars them [petitioners] from
membership in its local lodge which carries on the collective
bargaining process; uses its statutory position to compel them to
maintain membership in an inferior, racially segregated local; refuses
to exert any effort toward maintenance of the collective agreement
insofar as it pertains to the Negro members of the craft, resulting in
their loss of employment and employment rights; and refuses either
to hear their charges of discrimination or to take any steps to
investigate and redress their wrongs[.] 52
say. Third people watch for signs that the decision-maker is trying to treat them in an
even-handed manner. Finally, people value a process that accords them dignity and
respect."); Nancy A. Welsh, What's Justice Got To Do With It: Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 830-58 (2001) (examining the application
of procedural justice research and theory to court-connected mediation).
48. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (establishing the
duty of fair representative in the collective bargaining process); Archibald Cox, The Duty
of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); see Sherwin, supra note 34, at 303-
07.
49. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
50. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
51. In their Petition for A Writ of Certiorari, petitioners described the issue
regarding the union's violation of its duty of fair representation as follows:
Whether acts or omissions, racially discriminatory in nature, practiced by the
exclusive bargaining representative of a craft, against Negro members of the
craft, where there are no allegations that the bargaining representative was
unlawfully selected nor that the collective agreement is discriminatory in its
provisions, is such a breach of the statutory duty imposed upon such
representative by the National Railway Labor Act as might be redressed by
Negro members of the craft so harmed by suit in the Federal District Court for
injunctive relief and for damages?
Id. at 2, available at http://legall.cit.cornell.edulkevin/civprostories/chap07/conley02.pdf.
52. Petitioner's Brief, at 3, available at http://legall.cit.comell.edu/kevin/
civprostories/chap07/conley04.pdf.
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Not surprisingly, the Brotherhood and its chairmen did not agree
that their "passive" 5 3 failure to protest or prevent the Texas and New
Orleans Railroad from abolishing and then refilling those 45 jobs
represented "hostile discrimination" 54 by the union. Indeed, in their
brief, respondents urged that "[p]erhaps the most important single
problem of this brief is to correctly state the issues involved. In view of
what we regard as a grossly exaggerated statement of the questions
presented by Petitioners in their brief to this Court, we are persuaded that
precise clarification of the issues presented by the Complaint is of the
utmost importance if academic argument is to be avoided upon racial
discrimination questions which are here not actually involved."5 5
According to the Brotherhood, the petitioners' complaint alleged only
that the Railroad had discriminated by abolishing certain jobs-and the
petitioners had not sued the Railroad.56 The complaint failed to allege
that the Brotherhood had specifically: participated in the Railroad's
53. Brief for Respondents at 40-41, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (No. 7)
("Simply stated, the complaint alleges only that the Union has permitted, through failure
to prevent, the existence of the alleged discriminatory practices of the Railroad.").
54. Brief for Respondents at 13-14, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (No. 7)
("In substance, the factual allegations of the Complaint, which are unfairly described by
Petitioners as a planned course of conduct designed to discriminate against Petitioners
because of their race or color, are limited to action exclusively by the Railroad in
abolishing certain of Petitioners' jobs and curtailing their seniority rights, in none of
which the Brotherhood is alleged to have participated, agreed to, assisted in, conspired
for, known about, or done anything more than "suffered" such action by the Railroad 'to
transpire' and 'did not come to the aid' of Petitioners after the Railroad had acted. We do
not think that such conduct or omission by the Brotherhood constitutes either hostile
discrimination because of race or color or an abuse of its statutory authority and power as
claimed by Petitioners."). This language is unfortunately reminiscent of debates
regarding the point at which government supervisors can become liable for the acts of
other employees; see Kit Kinports, lqbal and Supervisory Liability, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
1291 (2010).
55. Brief for Respondents Pat J. Gibson, et al. at 2, Conley v. Gibson, No. 7 (Oct. 2,
1957). The reframing attempted here probably was in response to the entry of Judge
Joseph C. Waddy into this case. Judge Waddy, an African-American, was at that time a
lawyer located in Washington D.C. specializing in civil rights litigation. Previously, the
petitioners had been represented by a local Texas law firm-and had lost before both the
district and circuit courts, though they were granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. See
Sherwin supra note 34, at 296; see also Carla D. Pratt, Way to Represent: The Role of
Black Lawyers in Contemporary American Democracy,77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1409 (2009)
(emphasizing the important role of African-American lawyers in assisting members of
the African-American community to navigate the complicated pathways of the law and
gain their rightful place in the policy-making forums of a democratic nation). This
language in respondents' brief is also strikingly reminiscent of the Supreme Court's
description of Iqbal's claims as "extravagantly fanciful." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
56. Respondents had also moved for dismissal for failure to join a necessary party.
Apparently, petitioners chose not to sue the Railroad because this would have clearly
required them to take their claim to the National Railway Adjustment Board, when they
preferred to be in the federal courts. See Sherwin, supra note 34, at 311.
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abolition of the jobs, participated in any discussions with Railroad
officials regarding the abolition of such jobs, conspired in the abolition
of such jobs, acceded to the perpetration of the Railroad's acts "or that
Respondents in fact took any action in the alleged deprivation of
Petitioner's rights under the bargaining agreement."57  Asserting the
necessity of deferring to the union's assessment of a grievance's merit
before determining whether to pursue it, respondents asserted that
petitioners' real objective was "to obtain a holding that a bargaining
representative must process on behalf of Negro employees any grievance
regardless of its merits.,5 8  Ultimately, the respondents argued that
petitioners had not stated a claim against the union and should have
brought their action against the Railroad, rather than the Brotherhood.
Justice Black wrote the words "that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief' because this was a well-respected, though debated,
understanding of the pleading requirements of Rule 8-and because
these petitioners needed the federal courts to provide a public forum for
the voicing and investigation of their harms and the development of a
fair response.60  For purposes of this Article, though, it is useful to
consider the precise action the petitioners sought from the courts.
Ultimately, it was to shame61 or force6 2 their union to listen,
57. Brief for Respondents, supra note 55, at 18; see also id. at 4. This is reminiscent
of defendants' arguments in Twombly that "[e]ven 'conscious parallelism,' a common
reaction of 'firms in a concentrated market [that] recognize[e] their shared economic
interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions' is 'not in
itself unlawful' and the Court's later conclusion that because there was no "independent
allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs" . . . [n]othing contained in the
complaint invests either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of
conspiracy." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-554, 564, 566.
58. Brief for Respondents, supra note 55, at 16.
59. Sherwin, supra note 34, at 300-302.
60. See Sherwin, supra note 34. Professor Sherwin notes quite provocatively that
several of the justices had played a part in the creation of the New Deal, and were men of
action. Professor Sherwin also has provided an interesting aside regarding Justice
Black's possible frame of mind when this case was heard and decided: "Black, a widower
then aged 71, married his administrative assistant in September 1957, one month before
the oral arguments in Conley. His biographer reports that after his marriage, he spent less
time at the Court. He also began to give himself shots of testosterone." Sherwin, supra
note 34, at 300-301 (citing ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 469 (2d ed.
1997)).
61. Consider the potential effect of the majority and dissenting opinions in Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Even though the Supreme Court
found there that Ms. Lassiter's right to procedural due process had not been violated,
North Carolina subsequently amended its statute to provide counsel for indigent parents
facing termination of their parental rights; see Lassiter 452 U.S. at 18; N.C. GEN STAT.
7(b)-1 109(b)(1999); see Subrin, supra note 17, at 85 (In fact, "all states have adopted
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communicate, perhaps negotiate with, and even advocate for, all of its
members, not just those its local officials favored.
Other commentators have argued quite persuasively that the
petitioners did not actually need Justice Black to be so expansive in order
to justify reversal of the lower courts' dismissal of their claims. But
these African-American employees did need the Supreme Court to force
the lower courts, the Brotherhood, the Railroad and the Transport
Company to at least hear their claims.
How common is the sort of need exhibited by the African-American
union members who chose to sue in Conley? Unfortunately, it appears
that this need remains quite common for those who bear the burden of
marginalization-and even demonization-in our society. This Article
will now turn to civil litigation's role and promise in disrupting and
potentially realigning the default procedures of normal life.
statutes that either direct or permit judges to appoint counsel for parents or their children
when the state seeks to terminate parental rights.").
62. The U.S. Supreme Court did the same thing recently in its series of cases
addressing the procedures-or perhaps more accurately, the non-procedures-established
by the Bush Administration, with the acquiescence of Congress, for the indefinite
detention of enemy combatants in this country's continuing War on Terror. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and
Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 967, 972, 973 (2009); Gregory S. McNeal,
Organizational Culture, Professional Ethics and Guantanamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 125 (2009) (considering how the organizational culture literature can help to explain
the military culture's resistance to the institution of greater political control over military
commissions); Laura K. Donohue, The Brennan Center Jorde Symposium on
Constitutional Law: The Perilous Dialogue, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 357, 385 (2009) ("With
the legislature restricted in its ability to check and monitor the executive, the task of
pushing back falls to the judiciary.").
63. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (2007) ("To be fair to the Conley Court, the
passage should be understood in light of the opinion's preceding summary of the
complaint's concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably understood as amply
stating a claim for relief. But the passage so often quoted fails to mention that
understanding on the part of the Court, and after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this
famous observation has earned its retirement."); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of
Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically, 59 Am. U.L. REv. 553, 561(2010)
("In other words, the Union argued that the complaint's allegations of discrimination
were conclusory. Justice Black could have responded in kind to the Union's lack-of-
specificity argument by either pointing out that the complaint did make such allegations,
or that the specificity the Union wanted was irrelevant under the substantive law.
Instead, the Court retorted with the general philosophy of notice pleading.").
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II. THE DEFAULT PROCEDURES OFFERED BY NORMAL LIFE AND CIVIL
LITIGATION
Over two decades ago, William Felstiner and his colleagues
examined the transformation of harms into disputes. 4 They found, first,
that people often do not even perceive harms as injuries. These harms
are simply incident to living. At some point, however, certain harms are
"named" by society as injuries, and for some percentage of these injuries,
injured parties identify someone who is to "blame." For an even smaller
percentage of these injuries, injured parties transform their injuries into
"claims"-by approaching the alleged wrongdoer directly with a demand
for compensation or by invoking the power of a court or some other
neutral forum.65 The multiple and psychological steps involved in this
transformation process help to explain why researchers have found that
relatively few harms are transformed into lawsuits.66
Marc Galanter has similarly demonstrated that despite Americans'
reputation for litigiousness, a remarkably small percentage actually
transforms its identified injuries into claims. The likelihood of such
transformation has been found to be particularly low in the area of
discrimination.67  For many victims of long-standing discrimination,
perhaps the very act of making a claim, with its inevitable call for
attention and redress, requires a willingness to escalate conflict and face
unpleasant consequences. Not everyone is able or willing to bear such
64. See William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming. .. , 15 LAW & Soc'Y Rnv. 631, 631 (1980); see
also Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capacity, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 117-119 (2010) (describing the dispute perspective in legal
studies and the "dispute pyramid").
65. Felstiner, supra note 64, at 635-36.
66. See Kevin Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919,
1953 (2009) (observing that based on empirical research, "litigation is by no means a
knee-jerk or common reaction in the United States, as overall only 5% of the survey's
grievances ultimately resulted in a court filing") (citing Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat,
Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SoC'Y
REv. 525, 544 (1981)).
67. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REv. 4, 14 (1983) (almost three quarters failed to move from grievance to
claim) (citing Miller & Sarat, supra note 66, at 537, table 2).
68. See e.g., Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Lei Lai, Social Incentives for
Gender Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to
Ask, 103 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84 (2007) (research suggesting that
women who behave assertively in negotiation are judged more harshly than men who
behave similarly); CATHERINE H. TINSLEY, ET AL., NEGOTIATING YOUR PUBLIC IDENTITY:
WOMEN'S PATH TO POWER, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR
CONTEXT AND CULTURE (Christopher Honeyman, James Coben and Giuseppe De Palo,
eds. 2009) (arguing that women are perceived as more effective negotiators if they use
the caretaker stereotype and thus should frame their demands in terms of caring for
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consequences, and this dynamic alone could explain many marginalized
parties' hesitation to transform their harms into concrete disputes, claims
and demands. 6 9 Alternatively, marginalized parties may anticipate that
their claims will simply be ignored. Indeed, data from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission shows that while 80% of
employee-claimants express willingness to accept the agency's offer to
try mediation, only 30% of employer-respondents are willing to do so,70
thus suggesting that marginalized parties are wise to expect some degree
of stonewalling.
Several areas of research also suggest that once a marginalized party
effectively initiates a claim and begins to pursue a negotiated result, she
is likely to face obstacles in achieving a clearly advantageous outcome.
In part, this is simply the result of human beings' general bias toward
maintenance of the status quo.7 1 The status quo inevitably favors the
dominant party, and thus a change threatens the dominant party with loss
of status or access to some other valued resource, which as noted supra,
most human beings resist.7 2 But in addition, recent procedural justice
others); Laura Kray, Leading Through Negotiation: Harnessing the Power of Gender
Stereotypes, 50 CAL. MGMT. REV. 159 (2007) (urging women to exploit caretaker
stereotype).
69. See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION
AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 4 (Princeton University Press 2003) (reporting that in one study,
men were eight times more likely than women to negotiate for their salaries; in another
study, men were nine times as likely to ask for more money than was offered as payment
for participation in an experiment; and in a third experiment, men reported initiating four
times as many negotiations as women); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the
Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized
Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 573 n.337 (2004) (suggesting
this dynamic for parents of children with special needs); RUBIN ET. AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT:
ESCALATION, STALEMATE AND SETTLEMENT 117-67 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the
escalation of conflict, conditions that lead to stalemate, and how de-escalation begins).
70. See Clark, supra note 21. These results are consistent with research conducted
by Mediation Center with the Minnesota Human Rights Department in the 1980s, when
the Department first introduced the use of mediation to resolve discrimination claims.
See JUDITH L. JUHALA, SANDER H. LUND & BARBARA MCADOO, EVALUATION OF A SIX
MONTH PROJECT ON THE EFFECT OF TELEPHONE FOLLOW-UP ON PARTY WILLINGNESS TO
MEDIATE DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES iii, 12 (Mediation Center, 1989) (finding that
"charging parties were most likely to reject mediation because: they 'don't trust the other
party' (45%), 'don't believe the other party will be reasonable' (50%) or 'don't know
enough about mediation (37%)... . More than three-fourths (83%) of respondents who
declined mediation did so as a result of a belief that the other party did not have a case
worth mediating." Only 16% of charging parties identified this as their reason to decline
mediation. Ironically, "[a]lmost three quarters in both groups endorsed the statement
'people should communicate and cooperate when they have a dispute."').
71. See Anthony Vitarelli, Happiness Metrics In Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 115, 129 (2010) ("The endowment effect describes an individual's propensity to
overvalue the retention of a currently owned asset.").
72. See Lorenzo, supra note 10, at 789; Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives,
Gifts and Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, In Cultural
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research indicates that a higher-status party is likely to maintain a single-
minded focus on achieving the advantageous outcome he believes he
deserves, regardless of the procedural niceties offered by lower-status
parties.7 3  In contrast, a lower-status party is quite likely to accept a
disadvantageous outcome if she perceives that the higher-status party
provided her with the opportunity to speak, considered what she said and
tried to be open-minded and respectful. Indeed, when people find
themselves in situations that accentuate hierarchy and unequal status-
situations that then trigger strong suspicions that scarce resources will be
allocated on the basis of identity-based status rather than situation-
specific merit-they are particularly likely to notice if they have been
treated in a procedurally just manner. All of this suggests that if parties
with less power and lower status are treated like valuable members of a
group, they will tend to accept less advantageous outcomes. Though this
may be good for the preservation of community harmony, it does not
bode well for marginalized parties' substantive success in negotiation.
Simply on an instrumental basis, marginalized parties often have
fewer options and thus less ability to demand a good deal by threatening
to walk away. In two studies comparing car dealers' initial quotes to and
final deals with white males vs. white females vs. black males vs. black
females, for example, the white males received the best (lowest) initial
quotes and final deals; the black males and black females received the
and Psychological Perspective 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 423, 464 (2003) ("Group
identification and intergroup tension rise hand in hand when groups compete with one
another for resources, and conflict is more likely when groups reject each other's central
values."); Robert J. Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 166, 169 (observing that intergroup conflict arises when there is unequal
access to a valued resource).
73. See Ya-Ru Chen, et al., When Is It "A Pleasure To Do Business With You?" The
Effects of Relative Status, Outcome Favorability, and Procedural Fairness, 92 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1 (2003); see also JANE W. ADLER, ET AL., SIMPLE
JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 76, 83
(1983) (Unlike unsophisticated individual litigants, institututional litigants who made
extensive use of the arbitration program appeared to care little about "qualitative aspects
of the hearing process. They judge arbitration primarily on the basis of the outcomes it
delivers.")
74. See Jan-Willem Van Prooijen, et al., Procedural Justice and Status Salience as
Antecedent of Procedural Fairness Effects, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1353,
1359 (2002).
75. See Nancy Welsh, Perceptions ofFairness in Negotiation, supra note 47, at 171;
see also Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Does Fairness Matter More to Some than to
Others? The Moderating Role of Workplace Status on the Relationship Between
Procedural Fairness Perceptions and Job Satisfaction, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 161, 163
(2007); Jan-Willem Van Prooijen et al., Procedural Justice and Intragroup Status:
Knowing Where We Stand in a Group Enhances Reactions to Procedures, 41 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 644 (2005); Jody Clay-Warner, Perceiving Procedural
Injustice: The Effects of Group Membership and Status, 64 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 224 (2001).
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worst (highest) initial quotes and final deals. 6 The researchers
hypothesized that dealers anticipated that the white men would be most
likely to shop around; they thus required the best deals. The black males
and females, in contrast, were perceived as having less time and
tendency to comparison-shop. The dealers could treat them less well,
without suffering any negative consequences.
Research thus indicates that the default procedures of normal life
reflect and serve to maintain hierarchy and the unequal allocation of
resources and power.n Some people and institutions are likely to be
heard and to receive the resources to which they believe themselves to be
entitled. Other people and institutions are much less likely to be heard
and, if treated respectfully, will generally be willing to accept a smaller
allocation of resources.
In contrast, and particularly following the expansive definition of
notice pleading proclaimed in Conley, 8 the courts have seemed to
promise something different to those who perceive that their place in the
hierarchy and their share of coveted resources are so unfair and
unprincipled that they must be inconsistent with the rule of law.
Marginalized individuals who access the courts also gain access, at least
in theory, to the courts' expressive and coercive power to force several
significant changes in the default procedures of normal life. First and
perhaps most powerfully, the courts offer to the marginalized plaintiff a
forum in which to tell her story in full, initially in her written complaint
and ultimately before a judge or jury. The institutional defendant,
meanwhile, may be required to do many things in the course of civil
litigation that it is not required to do in normal life-e.g., respond
directly and in writing to the plaintiffs claims; reveal information to the
plaintiff; listen as the plaintiff makes her argument and offers her
evidence to an impartial and powerful adjudicator; make its own
arguments and offer its own evidence to the adjudicator; make these
arguments in a public forum; and abide by the decisions of the
adjudicator. As Professor Owen Fiss has observed, civil litigation
promises to equalize power-and though it regularly fails to achieve this
76. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817 (1991); lan Ayres, Further Evidence of
Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV.
109(1995).
77. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE
THEORY OF STRUCTURATION 19 (1984) ("[T]he rules and resources drawn upon in the
production and reproduction of social action are at the same time the means of system
reproduction (the duality of structure).").
78. Of course, heightened pleading is required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as well as by statute or by the courts in certain contexts. See Christopher
M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REV. 551, 551 (2002).
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promise, civil litigation's default procedures certainly have the effect of
modeling a modification to the balance of power that exists in normal
life.79
As noted supra, however, most litigated cases settle before trial,o
and most disputes are resolved without resort to litigation. This Article
now considers how the different default procedures of normal life and
civil litigation influence the likelihood and character of pre-trial and pre-
litigation consensual dispute resolution.
III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE DEFAULT PROCEDURES OF NORMAL LIFE
AND CIVIL LITIGATION ON THE LIKELIHOOD AND CHARACTER OF
PRE-TRIAL AND PRE-LITIGATION COMMUNICATION, NEGOTIATION
AND OTHER FORMS OF CONSENSUAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Beginning in the 1980s, and then with encouragement from
Congress8 1 and various state legislatures, 82 the courts have embraced
negotiation, mediation and other consensual dispute resolution
procedures conducted in the shadow of judicial hearings and trials.
79. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 1076; but see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute
Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1874-75 (1997) (contrasting ADR advocates with litigation
romanticists); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and
Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 560-61 (2006) (explaining that family
experience with the Holocaust and personal experience as a legal services lawyer have
kept her from becoming a "litigation romanticist").
80. See Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 1.
81. Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 471-482 (1990); Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C.A. § 651-658 (1998).
82. See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected General Civil ADR
Programs: Aiming for Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution, and the Experience of
Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 9 (Donna Stienstra & Susan M. Yates, eds.
2004) (describing various state statutory schemes requiring courts to offer ADR,
establishing pilot projects and enabling local courts to establish their own programs).
83. In 2004, for example, 13,566 federal district court cases were referred to
mediation; in 2005, 68 of 94 federal district courts had authorized referral to mediation.
See Donna Stienstra, Emerging Issues in Federal Court ADR, Presentation at The
Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University (Sept. 12, 2005)
(presentation materials on file with author). In 2006-2007, 2,070 general district court
mediations and 280 circuit court mediations occurred in Virginia; see ADR-The Wave
of the Future, Overview and Statistics, http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/
general-info/overviewandstatistics.pdf. In 2005-06, all twenty Florida judicial circuits
ordered some percentage of substantial ($15,000) non-family civil cases (i.e., "circuit"
cases) into mediation. FLA. STATE COURTS, FLORIDA MEDIATION & ARBITRATION
PROGRAMS: A COMPENDIUM 73 (19th ed., 2005-2006), http://www.flcourts.org/gen-
public/adr/bin/2006Compendium.pdf. Seven of those circuits kept sufficient data to
report that they had ordered 8,947 circuit court cases into mediation in 2005-2006, while
6,494 of these were mediated. Id. at 75; see also Sharon Press, Institutionalization of
Mediation in Florida: At the Crossroads, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 43, 55 (2003) (observing
that Florida's "'official' statistics only tell part of the story because court supported
mediators and mediation programs exist alongside a thriving private mediator sector").
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Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides for
the discussion of settlement in court-ordered judicial pre-trial
conferences and the use of other procedures, such as mediation, to
facilitate settlement.84 Indeed, courts have now become such advocates
for the use of mediation and its potential to reduce the expense and time
associated with civil litigation85 that some now require parties to
participate in mediation before discovery or after the completion of only
"bare bones" discovery.86  Professor Michael Moffitt, meanwhile, has
advocated for negotiation as a condition precedent to the filing of a civil
action.
84. F.R.C.P. R. 16(a)(5) and (c)(2)(I) (also requiring authorization by statute or local
rule for use of "special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute").
85. See Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, the Court is in Session: What Judges Say About
Court-Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 377, 394-97 (2007).
86. See e.g., ADR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, § 3.4(B) ("Unless otherwise ordered, the
mediation shall be held within 60 days after the Initial Case Management Conference
(Rule 16) or issuance of the Initial Case Management Order, whichever occurs first.");
Drake v. Laurel Highlands Found., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87185, *3 (W.D. Pa.
2007); Hughes v. InMotion Entm't, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63369, *15 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
See also Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-
Connected Mediation, 2002 J. OF DisP. RESOL. 241, 290-92 (2002) (describing the
positive effects of requiring early mediation in civil litigation in Ottawa and Toronto);
McAdoo, All Rise, supra note 85 at 386 (urging the development of rules for the early use
of mediation).
87. Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 749-56
(2005). Professor Moffitt has elaborated quite persuasively upon pleadings' potential to
chill optimally-productive negotiations:
Negotiation best practices counsel disputants away from virtually every one of
the effects of pleadings. Problem-solving theorists advise jointly constructing a
multi-factored, complex vision of the past. Pleadings demand the opposite.
Emotional and non-rational aspects of bargaining take center stage in much
negotiation literature. Pleadings suggest scrubbing problems of all such
considerations. Theorists argue that complex, systematic problems are best
addressed when every affected party gains a fuller understanding of the
contribution systems at play, so that a long-term solution can be crafted.
Pleadings focus the inquiry on blame allocation, with "contribution" treated as
merely a matter of proportional blame. Negotiation advice consistently
recommends maintaining a focus on the future, rather than on the past.
Pleadings speak only of the past, with the exception of assertions of entitlement
going forward. Classic negotiation theory advises considering underlying
interests, ongoing relationships, and multiple possible options, as a means of
jointly creating an efficient resolution to the problem. Pleadings limit
considerations according to legal relevancy, making integrative adjudicated
outcomes virtually impossible. A negotiation specialist charged with designing
a difficult-to-resolve problem could scarcely do better than to impose the
problem-definition conditions created by pleadings.
Id. at 747; see also Michael Moffitt, Iqbal and Settlement, supra note 20 (observing that
because Iqbal is likely to delay settlement conversations and enhance parties' focus on
pleadings, it is also likely to reduce the quality of settlements-i.e., increase zero-sum
thinking, reduce the potential for creative solutions, and reduce the ability to save
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Though lawyers' bilateral negotiations settle most civil lawsuits,
remarkably little is known about their clients' perceptions of this
procedure and its results.88 Court-connected mediation, in contrast, has
been the subject of substantially more study. First, it appears that most
court-connected mediations would not occur except for the fact of
judicial encouragement or mandate.89  Second, in the court-connected
context, it is not surprising (and arguably quite appropriate 90) to find that
mediation discussions are dominated by the lawyers' and mediators'
consideration of the law and litigation risk analysis.9 ' Third, research
nonetheless shows that most parties perceive that they had significant
input into the resolution of their dispute92 and are both satisfied with the
opportunity costs and transaction costs). Presumably, much as the courts found after they
began ordering parties to "participate in good faith" in mediation, they would need to
determine the circumstances under which they would sanction parties who failed to
attempt or respond to such pre-pleading negotiation. See SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, NANCY
HARDIN ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 7:6
(2008) (regarding good faith requirements generally); John Lande, Using Dispute System
Design Methods To Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation
Programs, 50 UCLA L. REv. 69, 78-86 (2002); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on
Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-
Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591 (2001); but see
Samara Zimmerman, Judges Gone Wild: Why Breaking the Mediation Confidentiality for
Acting in "Bad Faith" Should Be Reevaluated in Court-Ordered Mandatory Mediation,
11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 353 (2009) (examining Doe v. Francis and its
implications for the interaction between good faith participation requirements and the
promise of confidentiality in mediation).
88. But see E. Allan Lind, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 953, 958 (1990).
89. See e.g., Macfarlane, Culture Change?, supra note 86; Bobbi McAdoo, A Report
to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in
Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L.R. 403 (2002); Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge
of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Lawyer Perspectives on the Effect of
Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 MISSOURI L. R. 473 (2002); Rosselle L.
Wissler & Bob Dauber, Leading Horses to Water: The Impact of an ADR "Confer and
Report" Rule, 26 JusT. Sys. J. 253, 263-5 (2005) (finding that confer and report rules
alone did not increase the frequency of lawyers' early ADR discussions, but judicial
suggestions regarding use of voluntary ADR did increase the frequency of ADR
discussions at some point during litigation). There is no reliable data, however, regarding
the exact extent of private mediation.
90. See McAdoo & Welsh, Look Before You Leap, supra note 3, at 423 (suggesting
that perceptions of judges, lawyers and parties indicate that they seek mediated outcomes
that are fair and consistent with the rule of law).
91. See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The Problem"
in Court-Connected Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 863, 874-75 (2008); Nancy A.
Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 47, at 805-806; Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision
of Self-Determination in Court-Annexed Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2001).
92. See Roselle Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What
We Know From Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 641, 661 (reporting
that "[a] majority of the litigants not only felt the mediation process was fair (72%), but
that they had a sufficient chance to tell their views of the dispute (84%) and also had
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mediation process and perceive it as fair.9 3 For marginalized plaintiffs
who have brought an action against an institutional defendant, the
mediation may represent their first and only opportunity to be heard
effectively by someone they perceive as a representative of the courts-
the mediator-and by the decision-makers representing the institution. 94
In some mediation sessions-and more broadly, in some thoughtfully-
designed court-connected mediation programs 95-the parties and lawyers
may even be willing to discuss and resolve the non-legal, as well as
legal, issues and interests that gave rise to the litigation and will help
achieve real resolution.96  Importantly, most of these benefits of
mediation would not be realized for many marginalized plaintiffs if they
did not have access to the courts.
Public agencies have similarly institutionalized negotiation and
mediation in the shadow of adjudicative procedures. In the special
education context, for example, the IDEA originally provided only for
individualized education program (IEP) meetings between school
officials and the parents or guardians of children with special needs and,
in the event of disagreement between the school officials and parents or
guardians, due process hearings with appeal to the state educational
agency and then to state or federal court; after several years of
considerable input in determining the outcome (63%)" and that 55% expressed
satisfaction with their experience in mediation).
93. See Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 92, at 690-95 (reporting
that "[a] majority of the litigants not only felt the mediation process was fair (72%), but
that they had a sufficient chance to tell their views of the dispute (84%) and also had
considerable input in determining the outcome (63%)" and that 55% expressed
satisfaction with their experience in mediation); Julie Macfalane, Will Changing the
Process Change the Outcome? The Relationship between Procedural and Systemic
Change, 65 LA. L. REv. 1487, 1493-94 (2005); Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 47, at
830-58 (2001) (examining the application of procedural justice research and theory to
court-connected mediation).
94. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 47, at 838-46, 851-55 (examining the
opportunity for "voice" and "consideration" in court-connected mediation); Welsh,
Stepping Back Through, supra note 69, at 629-32 (examining parents' post-mediation
perceptions regarding the opportunity to be heard and comparing them to the perceptions
of school officials); but see Riskin & Welsh, Is That All There Is?, supra note 91, at 876,
894-95 (describing situations in which plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions would
have preferred conversation with doctors, who were not present because they were not
perceived as decision-makers with settlement authority) (citing Tamara Relis,
Consequences of Power, 12 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 445, 456-59 (2007)).
95. See Riskin & Welsh, Is That All There Is?, supra note 91, at 920-21, 929-30
(describing the various mechanisms used by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, U. S. District Court of the Northern District of California, and Dutch judges to
invite lawyers and parties to discuss relevant non-legal, as well as legal, issues and
interests in mediation).
96. See Riskin & Welsh, Is That All There Is,? supra note 91, at 902-21 (proposing
three mechanisms to broaden the "problem definition" of court-oriented mediation
sessions).
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experience with these procedures, Congress amended the IDEA to offer
mediation as a voluntary step before the due process hearing. Some
states require school districts to participate in the process if it is elected
98by the parents or guardians, a policy which makes sense as a means to
avoid the costs and risk of a due process hearing and, potentially, to
improve the school officials' working relationship with the parents or
guardians. Research suggests that parents elect to participate in special
education mediation only after they have concluded that they are unable
to communicate effectively with school officials in their regularly-
scheduled IEP meetings and because they fear the likely financial,
emotional or relational toll of due process hearings.99 After all, their
children generally remain in the same schools or school districts, under
the supervision of the very same officials and teachers likely to
participate in the due process hearing. Mediation-and the availability
of a mediator to facilitate more effective communication, both in terms
of speaking and listening-appears a responsive, somewhat less
contentious option under the circumstances presented. Nonetheless, the
availability of the due process hearing plays an important role, both in
motivating school officials to participate in mediation and in signaling to
the parents federal recognition of their children's potential, the right to be
meaningfully included in decision-making about their children's
education, and judicial assistance in enforcing such rights.
Other institutional defendants have also introduced mediation as an
option to avoid making a formal claim. The U.S. Postal Service (USPS),
for example, offers its employees the opportunity to mediate disputes
among employees and managers through the REDRESS program. If
USPS employees perceive that they are being treated unfairly, they may
"lump it" (probably complaining to family members, friends and
colleagues but not actually working to resolve the problem) or access
several avenues to pursue a "claim," including raising and discussing
their concerns directly with their managers; bringing a grievance under
their collective bargaining agreement; bringing an EEO claim (which
97. See Welsh, Stepping Back Through, supra note 69, at 612-19 (describing the
legal context of special education mediation); Grace D'Alo, Accountability in Special
Education Mediation: Many A Slip 'Twixt Vision and Practice?, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV.
201, 202 (2003) (describing the history and experience of Pennsylvania's program for
special education mediation and the inclusion of mediation in the IDEA's procedural
safeguards).
98. See id. at 617, n.192.
99. See Welsh, Stepping Back Through, supra note 69, at 620-23 (describing
parents' pre-mediation perceptions of the value of special education mediation); Peter J.
Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special Education
Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 35, 40-41 (1997) (noting
that due process "hearings have large personal and transactional costs" and that both
"[p]arents and school officials find them stressful, draining, and traumatic").
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will result in an investigation and may be followed by civil litigation); or
requesting mediation, with an outside mediator paid by the USPS. Many
USPS employees have voluntarily chosen mediation as the best of these
options. 100
Importantly, the USPS mediation program arose out of civil
litigation-an employment discrimination class action. As part of the
settlement of that case, USPS agreed to institutionalize mediation in its
operations in Florida, as an alternative to the filing of an EEO claim.10'
The experiment was so successful in reducing EEO claims that the USPS
decided to make it a national program. Interestingly, however, the USPS
required its REDRESS mediators to move from a "facilitative" to a
"transformative" mediation approach.102 The key differences between
these approaches are that transformative mediators do not have
settlement as their primary goal and do not offer evaluations of parties'
claims or defenses. 0 3  The role of the transformative mediator is to
ensure that parties have the opportunity to express themselves, hear each
other, and exercise self-determination in both the procedure and
resolution. The transformative mediator's ultimate objective is to help
the parties improve their "conflict interaction" with each other.104 The
focus is thus enhancement of the productivity of this interpersonal
interaction, rather than evaluation of the merits of the particular discrete
dispute.
Professor Lisa Bingham, who has conducted extensive research
regarding the effects and operations of REDRESS, has explained that the
USPS choice to use transformative mediation related entirely to the
organization's goals for the process. 0 s Top administrators hoped to
improve the workplace environment at USPS. It may be useful to recall
here that the term "going postal" had recently emerged as a result of
several dramatic workplace killings involving USPS employees as
100. See Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research
Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 101, 115 (2002) (noting that 74%
of employees voluntarily chose to participate in USPS REDRESS mediation).
101. Id. at 112-13.
102. See Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the USPS
REDRESS 'rm Program: Observations ofADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
399, 401-02 (2001); Lisa B. Bingham, Mediation at Work: Transforming Workplace
Conflict at the United States Postal Service 14-15 (2003), available at http://
www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/Bingham-Report.pdf.
103. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION
217 (Revised ed., 2005).
104. See James R. Antes et al., Transforming Conflict Interactions in the Workplace:
Documented Effects of the USPS REDRESS (TM) Program, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 429, 430-31 (2001) see also Welsh, Stepping Back Through, supra note 69, at 591-94
(generally describing transformative mediation at the USPS).
105. See Bingham, Why Suppose?, supra note 100, at 114-15.
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shooters and victims.10 6  The top USPS administrators also wanted
employees to enter into mediation voluntarily, as an alternative to filing
an EEO claim. If REDRESS mediators began evaluating the legal merits
of employees' claims, top USPS administrators anticipated that most
employees inevitably would hear that their claims were without legal
merit and would be dismissed by the EEOC or the courts.107 Soon,
employees would reject mediation as an alternative to filing an EEO
claim, believing that mediation was just another USPS mechanism for
promising to address but ultimately squelching its employees'
complaints. Requiring the use of transformative mediation avoided this
outcome.
Indications are that the REDRESS program has worked. Most
mediations result in case closure. 08  EEO filings continue to be
reduced,' 09 and the USPS can also show cost savings as a result of using
mediation."o Managers report improvements in their ability to listen to
their employees and handle conflicts."' Brilliantly, the USPS
established a program that gained legitimacy from its placement as an
alternative to the EEO's legal/administrative procedure but actually
delivers a non-legal, vaguely therapeutic process for parties caught in
dysfunctional work relationships. Importantly, once again, it is civil
litigation that triggered the introduction and design of this useful,
consensual procedure-and may be available in the event that mediation
does not work.112
106. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused: Is Termination the Solution
When Domestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 276 (2006)
("Many fear employees 'going postal' (a derogatory phrase derived from the string of
murders in post office locations around the country).").
107. The vast majority of EEO claims at the USPS had been found to be without
sufficient merit to proceed further. Many have argued more generally that employees
often access this legal-administrative mechanism as their only avenue to express very real
but non-legally-cognizable frustrations.
108. See Lisa B. Bingham, et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment
Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009)
(reporting case closure rate of 72.3%); Lisa B. Bingham & Mikaela Cristina Novac,
Mediation's Impact on Formal Discrimination Filing: Before and After the REDRESS "M
Program at the U.S. Postal Service, 21 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 308, 311 (2001).
109. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation,
22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145, 158 (2004); Bingham & Novac, Mediation's Impact on
Formal Discrimination Complaint Filing, supra note 108, at 326.
110. See David B. Harwi and George Reath, Jr., Conflict, Management and Mediation
(2002) available at http://www.niacr.org/papers/article7.htm.
111. See Jonathan F. Anderson & Lisa Bingham, Upstream Effects from Mediation of
Workplace Disputes: Some Preliminary Evidence from the USPS, 48 LAB. L.J. 601, 607-
08 (1997); Bingham, Case for Mediation, supra note 109, at 158.
112. Now, after Twombly and Iqbal, this is true if the discrimination claim can
survive a 12(b)(6) motion-and the question of of such survival is the subject of some
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Over the past decade, other agencies and companies have also
created dispute systems designed to provide internal-and consensual-
opportunities to identify and resolve workplace disputes, with the effect
of improved management systems and the avoidance of litigation and
liability. Research suggests that these employers, like the USPS, are
achieving their goals. 13 Some employers have institutionalized an entire
continuum of dispute resolution procedures1 4 to deal with employment-
related disputes. It appears that for employers with such a continuum,
the consensual processes effectively screen out the cases in which
employees have strong claims, leaving only the weakest to proceed to
binding arbitration"' or civil litigation. Outside the employment context,
debate. See e.g., Suja Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
113. See Nancy Welsh, What is "(am)Partial Enough" in a World of Embedded
Neutrals, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395 (2010) ("In some instances, as well, it appears that the
employers who adopt employment arbitration have institutionalized a continuum of other
dispute resolution processes that screens out the strongest cases, leaving only the weakest
to proceed to arbitration.") (citing Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment
Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-
Regulation Makes a Diference, in ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT
ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 303, 323, tbl.2 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004); Alexander J.S.
Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amid the Sound and
Fury?, 11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 414-415 (2007)); see Lisa B. Bingham, Self-
Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 873, 885 (2002) (observing how designers of dispute systems can choose how,
when, and whom to empower). Howard Gadlin, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Management: Integrated Conflict Management Systems, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, 487 (Moffitt et. al. ed., 2005); Howard Gadlin, Addressing the Thornier
Complexities of Racial Discrimination Complaints in the Workplace, DISP. RESOL. MAG.
Spring 2009, at 25, 26.
114. See Lisa B. Bingham & Tina Nabatchi, Dispute System Design in Organizations,
in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 105, 116 (William J. Pammer, Jr. & Jerri
Killian eds., 2003) ("An integrated conflict management system is a coordinated network
of conflict resolution options that is available to persons for resolving conflict in an
organization."); John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and
Other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619, 630 (2007) ("The ADR field
has developed a subfield for policymaking about disputing, called "dispute system
design" (DSD). DSD focuses on systematically managing a series of disputes rather than
handling individual disputes on an ad hoc basis. Private businesses use it to manage
conflicts with employees, customers, and suppliers."); see generally Stephanie Smith &
Jan Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 123, (2009).
115. See Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and
After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a
Difference, in ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303,
323, tbl. 2 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds. 2004); Welsh, supra note 50;
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study ofEmployment Arbitration
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hospitals are also now adopting mediation and other procedures to try to
reach resolution and reduce the likelihood of medical malpractice
claims."' Many companies have also institutionalized mediation and
other procedures to resolve disputes with customers and vendors. 17
All of these in-house initiatives recognize that people bring claims
for both legal and non-legal reasons.' 18  From the perspective of
institutional defendants, if potential plaintiffs' non-legal concerns can be
acknowledged and dealt with, there may be no need for legal action with
its attendant-and risky-obligations to answer, permit discovery,
respond to plaintiffs' emotional appeals and narratives with legal
arguments, and abide by third parties' decisions." 9  While the
institutionalization of negotiation, mediation and other consensual
dispute resolution processes also seems designed to improve the
likelihood of early identification and resolution of disputes, as well as
contribute to increased levels of satisfaction and productivity, it is
Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 777, 807-808 (2003); Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum
at Low Cost, DisP. RESOL. J., May/July 2003, at 9.
116. See Christopher Guadagnino, Ph.D., Malpractice Mediation Poised to Expand,
PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST (Apr. 2004) ("The first institution in Pennsylvania to adopt a
formal co-mediation program is Drexel University College of Medicine in Philadelphia,
which recently became self-insured after its previous malpractice insurer pulled out of the
medical malpractice line of business, according to Drexel's Chief Counsel Tobey
Oxholm, Esq." and "Penn State Hershey Medical Center has used mediation for about
three years as part of its approach to dealing with medical malpractice. . . ."); see Sorry
Works! Coalition, About Us, http:// www.sorryworks.net/about.phtml (last visited Apr.
26, 2009).
117. See Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization, supra note 2, at 489
(listing Motorola, Toro, General Mills, Bank of America, Shell International, American
Airlines, Coca-Cola Enterprises, Aetna, and CIGNA as examples of companies that have
institutionalized dispute resolution procedures, including mediation).
118. See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The Problem"
in Court-Connected Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 863 (2008); Smith, supra note 6,
at 124 (stating that a lawyers role has changed from purely legal duties to a problem
solver. "They are called upon to be organizational problem solvers as members of
multidisciplinary teams. And-most interesting to us-attorneys in these broader roles
sometimes have the opportunity to help organizations create or improve systems that
prevent or address conflicts before and after they evolve into full-fledged disputes.");
Tamara Relis, Consequences of Power, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 445, 467 (2007);
TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS,
PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES 139-41 (2009) (noting that female lawyers
representing hospitals were unusual in their intention to use mediation to serve extralegal,
as well as legal, goals).
119. See Michelle A. Travis et. al., Dispute Resolution in Action: Examining the
Reality of Employment Discrimination Cases: Proceedings of the 2007 Annual Meeting,
Association of American Law Schools, Sections on Employment Discrimination and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 11 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 139 (2007)
(observing that facilitative mediators produce a "compressed range of settlements" while
the average financial settlement was higher with mediators using evaluative
interventions; the authors "deemed this phenomenon 'Feel Good vs. More Money').
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unlikely these benefits would have been realized if institutions had not
been seeking to avoid the risks presented by the default procedures of
civil litigation.
It is important to acknowledge that the default inequities of normal
life do not entirely disappear in mediation. A study comparing the
results achieved by Hispanic and Anglo parties in mediation produced
distressingly disparate results-except, interestingly enough, when the
co-mediators were both Hispanic. 1 20 The parents participating in special
education mediation, described supra, clearly perceived the school
officials as the most powerful actors in their mediation sessions. 12 1
Howard Gadlin, ombudsman and director of the Center for Cooperative
Resolution at the National Institutes of Health, has raised concerns about
institutional exploitation of mediation and other consensual procedures,
suggesting that they can serve to entrench managers' and administrators'
power and discourage legal action when it should be pursued.12 2 He has
been joined by Professor Leah Wing who argues that mediation is not
achieving the social justice goals that advocates originally intended. 12 3
These are not the first commentators to raise serious and well-founded
120. See MICHELLE HERMANN ET AL., METROCOURT PROJECT FINAL REPORT: A STUDY
OF THE EFFECTS OF ETHNICITY AND GENDER IN MEDIATED AND ADJUDICATED CASES AT
THE METROPOLITAN COURT MEDIATION CENTER (1993); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack,
The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated
and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 767 (1996); see also Leah Wing,
Mediation and inequality reconsidered: Bringing the discussion to the table, 26 CONFL.
RESOL. Q. 383 (2009).
121. See Welsh, Stepping Back Through, supra note 69, at 652-55.
122. See Howard Gadlin, Bargaining in the Shadow of Management, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 381 (Michael Moffitt & Robert Bordone, eds.)
(2005) (describing how mediation and other dispute resolution processes have been co-
opted by managers to reassert their authority); Gadlin, Addressing the Thornier
Complexities of Racial Discrimination, supra note 113, at 25, 26 (expressing uneasiness
about use of mediation to respond to employment discrimination claims and noting that
"most people in the field are quick to dismiss neutrality as a myth and to challenge the
ideal of impartiality as illusory even while those terms continue to be employed in most
formal and informal mediator job descriptions"); see also Amalia Kessler, Deciding
Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and
the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN LAW 423 (2009) (exploring how the potential transplant of European
conciliation courts to America was rejected as patriarchal and deference-based and thus
inappropriate for independent and individualistic Americans who demanded a formal,
adversarial adjudication process which also promoted freedom and free enterprise).
123. Leah Wing, Mediation and Inequality Reconsidered: Bringing the Discussion to
the Table, 26 CONFL. RESOL. Q. 383 (2009); see also Susan K. Hippensteele, Revisiting
the Promise of Mediation for Employment Discrimination Claims, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 211, 249 (2009) (concluding that "the processes of mediation, the outcomes of
mediation, and the mediators themselves warrant greater scrutiny than they have been
subject to thus far").
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concerns about blind advocacy for mediation and other consensual
procedures. As I have noted elsewhere:
First, critics argue that mediation ... do[es] not effectively protect
disputants from preexisting social, political, and economic
inequalities. The resulting incorporation of such inequalities means
that disadvantaged disputants cannot truly engage as equals in the
deliberation and decisionmaking that occur within a dispute
resolution process. Second, because these dispute resolution
processes and their outcomes often are private, the broader citizenry
is unable to engage in public discussion and deliberation. Last,
because the freedom and equality of the disputants are not guaranteed
and their deliberations are not public, critics argue that there is no
assurance that the resulting "distribution of goods [will be] just (or at
least not unjust)." 24
These past and current commentators' concerns deserve (and have
received) attention. Yet, it is difficult to argue that a democratic people
should not even be allowed to try to resolve their disputes themselves,
through the mechanisms of negotiation, mediation or other consensual
procedures, as long as the procedures and results are sufficiently fair.'25
Mediation's actual and potential faults, however, illustrate the need to
ensure that adjudicative procedures exist as a robust counterbalance to
consensual procedures. Tellingly, some of the commentators who have
raised concerns about the use of mediation have called for a "renewed
focus on making democratically selected judges and juries more
124. Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from
Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 57 (2004).
125. Even as I make this argument, I recall the arguments made by judges during the
Lochner era, that immigrant workers-men, women, children-should be allowed to
enter into employment arrangements providing for 60 hour weeks, 7 days a week, and
unsafe working conditions. It is always possible for the more powerful to exploit the
less-powerful's questionable ability to engage in effective self-determination. The
doctrine of unconscionability in contract law may operate as a brake on such exploitation,
at least for those who take their cases to court. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 757 (2004)
("Although the unconscionability norm presents drawbacks, it remains an essential tool
for policing arbitration terms in contracts."); but see Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns
Twenty: the Regulation ofFairness in Securities Arbitration 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 495-
96 (2008) ("[T]he Supreme Court's FAA decisions in the past twenty years have imbued
the FAA with super status: the FAA governs virtually every arbitration clause arising out
of a commercial transaction, including securities arbitration, it applies in both state and
federal court, it preempts any conflicting state law, and it embodies a strong national
policy favoring arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. This policy
naturally disfavors extensive judicial review of arbitration awards and has led lower
courts to develop a stringent test to prevail on a challenge to the procedural fairness of an
arbitration proceeding.")
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accessible on a timely basis and at a reasonable cost"l 26 in order to test
the appeal of negotiation and mediation for marginalized parties. They
clearly did not anticipate the reduced access to judges and juries that is
now potentially signaled by Twombly and Iqbal.
IV. TWOMBLY'S AND IQBAL'S DISCOURAGEMENT OF PRE-LITIGATION
COMMUNICATION AND NEGOTIATION
Procedural change rarely captures the public imagination, but its
societal effects can be profound. With its expansive affirmation of notice
pleading in Conley, the Supreme Court strengthened plaintiffs' hands-
in response to a pattern of unions' and employers' refusal to respond to
individuals they apparently believed they could marginalize without
suffering any negative consequence.
In contrast, Twombly and Iqbal urge federal judges to decide not to
hear and not to engage with marginalized parties whose claimed legal
harms fail to comport sufficiently with an individual judge's "judicial
experience and common sense" 127 and thus are unable to be "nudged ...
across the line . . . to plausible."1 28 The reliance on individual judges'
experience and common sense is particularly troubling. Professor Jayne
Docherty, examining different cultural approaches to the handling of
conflict and its resolution, has observed that "our own cultures are
largely invisible to us; they are simply our 'common sense'
understandings of the world."129 Professor Jeff Rachlinski has suggested
that many of our current judges may now share a common culture as past
prosecutors, 130 a common world view that emerges out of that shared
experience, and a common sense that may not be entirely common.' 1'
126. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice supra note 124, at 58 (citing Deborah
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is
Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165 (2003); Deborah Hensler,
Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 81 (2002);
Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial
Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 155 (2002)).
127. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
128. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
129. Jayne Seminare Docherty, Culture and Negotiation: Symmetrical Anthropology
for Negotiators, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 711, 715 (2004).
130. And prosecutors generally enjoy more power than defense counsel in the
negotiations that occur in the criminal context-i.e., plea bargaining. See Andrea Kupfer
Schneider, Cooperating or Caving In: Are Defense Attorneys Shrewd or Exploited in
Plea Bargaining Negotiations?, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 145 (2007).
131. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Why Heightened Pleading-Why Now?, 114 PENN ST.
L. REV. 1247 (2010); see also Darrell A. H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L.
REV. 999, 1011 (2010) (urging that judges should learn to make appropriate use of
empathy, with our system of rules "encourage[ing] perspective taking to compensate for
experiential deficits, while simultaneously arresting the empathetic process at the
moment it turns into altruism, prejudice or bias").
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While this Article has presented courts' direct and indirect
encouragement of pre-litigation and pre-trial consensual procedures as
positive outcomes of Conley's liberal pleading standard, Twombly and
Iqbal suggest a different worldview regarding negotiation and settlement.
In Twombly, Justice Souter relies on articles and cases that are nearly two
decades old to posit the alleged futility of judicial case management and
the "dark side" of consensual procedures:
And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot [be]
solved by "careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment
stage," much less "lucid instructions to juries"; the threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably, then, it is
only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level
suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially
enormous expense of discovery in cases with non "'reasonably
founded hope that the [discover ] process will reveal relevant
evidence"' to support a § 1 claim.
Justice Souter frames communication, negotiation and settlement as
unprincipled blackmail. He directs particular skepticism toward the time
and effort required, and the ultimate futility, of judicial case
management.13 3  Similarly, in Iqbal, Justice Kennedy points out how
civil litigation-and presumably, parties' required participation in
judicial settlement conferences-can distract government officials from
the accomplishment of their mission: "[W]e are impelled to give real
content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who
must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of
their duties."' 34 The sort of engagement required by civil litigation-
responding to plaintiffs' claims, dealing with discovery, communicating
with the judge-seems to be viewed here as unnecessary and unhelpful,
particularly when corporate leaders are dealing with fierce global
competition, agency heads are responding to a terrifying and invisible
enemy, and judges are under pressure to make quick work of their
caseloads. Listening, communicating, responding-the Supreme Court's
language suggests that these represent a waste of time that needs to be
directed elsewhere, especially when it is marginalized parties who are
132. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added).
133. This is confusing since judicial case management has proven quite effective
overall. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET.AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (Rand 1996). Meanwhile, the cases and articles
regarding judicial case management to which Justice Souter refers are quite old. Id.
134. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (emphasis added).
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asking for attention and thus demanding a different and unpopular
allocation of scarce social resources. 3 5
Though Judge Lee Rosenthal has urged quite persuasively that
federal courts are being careful in their application of Twombly and Iqbal
to civil rights claims,'36 it is difficult not to fear that these decisions'
solicitous protection of the prerogatives of institutions and institutional
officials will embolden them in just the way that lower courts' decisions
in Conley seemed to encourage the Brotherhood and its leaders to behave
as they did in the events leading up to the Supreme Court's decision.
Less dramatically, courts may perceive that they have less need for pre-
trial mediation to dispose of cases. Institutional actors may begin
reconsidering and rescinding their offers to engage with employees and
other marginalized parties in pre-litigation procedures. And even if
courts continue to offer mediation and institutions maintain their dispute
systems, Twombly and Iqbal are likely to weaken marginalized
claimants' already-disadvantaged hands.
Pre-trial and pre-litigation consensual procedures that offer real
voice and opportunity for effective dialogue and resolution to
marginalized individuals should be lauded, not undermined. Surely our
courts, as part of a democratic justice system, want to continue to
encourage individuals and institutions to listen to each other and work
together toward solutions, before accessing expensive and precious
public resources. Assuring access to the courts helps to achieve this
goal.
V. SUMMARY JURY TRIAL AS A POTENTIAL RESPONSIVE OPTION
Others have offered excellent alternatives to Twomby and Iqbal as
part of this symposium 1 3 7 and elsewhere. 3 8 Professor Ray Campbell, in
135. See Fisher, supra note 72; see also Rafeal Efrat, Attribution Theory Bias and the
Perception of Abuse in Consumer Bankruptcy, 10 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 205,
217 ("As a result of the failure to follow the objective paradigm envisioned in the
attribution theory, a person's perception of the cause of another's behavior becomes
vulnerable to a number of biases, thus becoming less accurate."); Keith G. Allred, Anger
and Retaliation in Conflict: The Role of Attribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 236 (Moffitt et. al. ed., 2005).
136. See Rosenthal, supra note 26.
137. See Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleading as a
Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1191 (2010).
138. See Edward A. Hartnett, The Changing Shape ofFederal Civil Pretrial Practice:
Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (2010). See also Angelique
EagleWoman (Wambdi A. WasteWin), A Constitutional Crisis When the U.S. Supreme
Court Acts in a Legislative Manner? An Essay Offering a Perspective on Judicial
Activism in Federal Indian Law and Federal Civil Procedure Pleading Standards
(manuscript on file with author) (commenting on proposed statutory solutions and noting
that "[flor scholars of federal Indian law, the Court's judicial activism has been a
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particular, has proposed a potential two-step examination of plaintiffs'
pleadings, with the plaintiff electing to submit to reduced scrutiny at the
first step in order to gain limited discovery but then proceeding to a
second step involving stricter scrutiny of her pleadings.1 39 This option
seems especially appropriate in the small percentage of civil lawsuits that
are likely to involve disproportionate levels of discovery.140 I will offer a
brief addendum to this proposal, drawn from past experiments with one
particular court-connected dispute resolution procedure that has largely
fallen into disuse. My addendum is designed to respond to the concerns
that have been expressed about costly and wasteful discovery in some
cases while focusing on providing marginalized plaintiffs with a
meaningful forum in which to tell their stories and engage in informed,
consensual dispute resolution.14 1  Specifically, I propose the use of
summary jury trial to aid courts as they determine whether to allow
plaintiffs to proceed into discovery-or after they have completed the
limited discovery proposed by Professor Campbell.
The summary jury trial, which was first introduced by Judge
Thomas Lambros in 1980,142 combines elements of the jury trial with
negotiation and judicial settlement conferences. Counsel present
abbreviated arguments to a jury, supplemented by limited witness
testimony and documentary evidence. The proceeding is short, generally
lasting a half-day to one full day in more complex cases. Following the
constant complaint rarely heeded by Congress. Now that the Court has expanded its
judicial activism to limit vindication of federal rights created by Congress, the Court's
oppressive tactics in federal Indian law may gain much needed attention.")
139. See Campbell, supra note 137.
140. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" A Little More, 52 SMU L. REv.
229, 246-49 (1999) (summarizing research showing that for the vast majority of lawsuits,
there is no or a reasonable amount of discovery, but that a very small percentage-less
than 5% to 100/o-involved a large volume of discovery activity and discovery disputes;
also indicating that the amount in dispute has the highest correlation with discovery
problems); Thomas E. Willging, et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525, 527 (1998)
(reporting in Federal Judicial Center study that "the typical case has relatively little
discovery, conducted at costs that are proportionate to the stakes of the litigation, and ...
discovery generally-but with notable exceptions-yields information that aids in the
just disposition of cases").
141. It appears that my proposal will thus be consistent with the request made by
many lawyers responding to questions from the Federal Judicial Center regarding the
impact of Twombly and Iqbal. See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, In Their
Words: Attorney Views About Costs and Procedures in Federal Civil Litigation, 34
(Federal Judicial Center, March 2010) ("Following the cost-focused theme of these
interviews, more than half of the suggestions [from lawyers] clustered on procedures to
increase opportunities for case evaluation and settlement during the early stages of civil
litigation").
142. See Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods
ofDispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 481, 468-89 (1984).
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parties' presentation of their cases, the jury deliberates and returns with
its verdict. The verdict is advisory, not binding. The lawyers often then
poll individual members of the jury to determine why they decided as
they did. The jury is thanked for its service and excused, and the parties
and their lawyers then convene to try to negotiate a resolution, informed
by the jury's verdict and individual jurors' reasoning. The judge may
join the lawyers and parties, to facilitate their settlement discussions.
As Judge Lambros has noted, the proceeding "is designed to
provide a 'no-risk' method by which the parties may obtain the
perception of six jurors on the merits of their case without a large
investment of time or money.... SJT is a predictive tool that counsel
may use to achieve a just result for their clients at minimum expense."1 43
The summary jury trial also provides the parties with the opportunity to
present their narratives, listen to each other in a structured, respectful
setting, and then negotiate to a resolution.
The particulars of the summary jury trial could be adapted in a
myriad of ways to respond to today's needs. Discovery and motion
practice preceding the summary jury trial could be limited, by agreement
or by local rule. The number of jurors could vary. Members of the jury
might be permitted to ask questions during the proceeding or submit
written questions to the judge. The judge presiding over the summary
jury trial could also provide her assessment of the parties' cases and
anticipated verdict.144 Liability and damages could be bifurcated. Public
access could be required. A mediator, rather than a judge, could assist
the parties' and lawyers' subsequent settlement negotiations.
Most significantly for purposes of this Article, a summary jury trial
would provide a marginalized plaintiff with the opportunity to tell her
story to a judge, jury and decision-makers for the defendant. It would
approximate the experience of procedural justice provided by a "day in
court" while also offering the opportunity for settlement-and risk
management-through a consensual dispute resolution process.14 5
143. Id.
144. This assumes that the judge would not also preside over trial, if the case did not
settle.
145. See Steven Croley, Summary Jury Trials in Charleston County, South Carolina,
Loy. L. A. L. REV. 1585 (2008) (describing Charleston County's use of summary jury
trials for tort claims involving low damages); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary
Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 165, 204 (2010) (proposing the use of preliminary
judgments and citing to use of summary jury trial as a similar procedure); Janine Robben,
Oregon's Vanishing Civil Jury Trial: A Treasured Right, or a Relic?, 70-NOV OR. ST. B.
BULL. 19, 24-25 (describing a proposed one-day "fast track" trial option with limited
discovery and motion practice); but see Elizabeth Schneider, The Changing Shape of
Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Federal Civil Rights and
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517, 567 (2010) (positing that
summary jury trial may have a disparate impact on civil rights and employment
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Even more important, it would be likely to trigger anticipatory
consensual dispute resolution. Negotiations could (and likely would)
occur prior to the summary jury trial. The sorts of internal dispute
systems designed earlier likely would be maintained, in part to avoid the
occurrence of a summary jury trial. Mediation could be made part of the
summary jury trial-or could occur long before the process. The courts
would continue to play a key role in encouraging and modeling mutual,
respectful and productive pre-trial and pre-litigation communication,
negotiation, mediation and other types of consensual dispute resolution.
CONCLUSION
Professor Marc Galanter has noted recently:
[T]he legal systems of (most?) modem democracies are designed in a
way that if everyone with a legitimate claim invoked them, the
system would collapse. The viability of such systems depends on:
(a) the efficacy of "general effects," i.e., exerting control though
communication of information rather than actual enforcement; (b) the
availability of informal proxies for legal action; and, finally, (c) the
apathy, ignorance, cultural and cost barriers that inhibit the assertion
of legal rights. Such systems are inherently tokenist and symbolic-
rules are there to be celebrated and cherished, not to be applied in
every instance that they presumptively cover.146
Judge Wayne Brazil, meanwhile, has written quite movingly about "the
courts' most precious and only necessary assets":
[P]ublic confidence in the integrity of the processes the courts
sponsor and public faith in the motives that underlie the courts'
actions. We must take great care not to make program design
decisions that invite parties to infer that the courts care less about
doing justice and offering valued service than about looking out for
themselves as institutions (e.g., by reducing their workload, or off-
loading kinds of cases that are especially taxing or emotionally
difficult or that are deemed "unimportant"). 47
Both Professor Galanter and Judge Brazil recognize the special role that
our courts can and should play in delivering-and encouraging and
modeling-sufficiently just procedures and outcomes to American
citizens.
discrimination cases, but acknowledging the difficulty in analyzing this); Richard A.
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1986).
146. Galanter, Access to Justice, supra note 64, at 118-19.
147. Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found A Better
Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 93, 124 (2002).
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Access to our courts is essential if our still-young democratic nation
really means to fulfill its heady but difficult promises of political and
social inclusion and mobility. 148 Our public justice system certainly
relies upon the private risk management that occurs in negotiation,
mediation and other consensual dispute resolution procedures, in order to
avoid overload and the collapse referenced by Professor Galanter. Less
obviously, the risk management that takes place in negotiation,
mediation and other consensual processes must be counterbalanced by
the expressive and coercive powers of a robust justice system, accessible
to the marginalized and less powerful, in order to avoid cooptation by the
inequities of the default procedures of normal life.
The experience of justice is certainly a public good, 14 9 but it is not a
commodity. This is easy to forget in light of the valuation, purchase and
sale of legal rights that occur so frequently within the shadow of our
courthouses. Much like real science, real conversation, real music, real
dancing and even real relationships, the experience of real justice
requires mutual engagement and patience with a never-ending, ever-
evolving process, characterized by constant give-and-take and
unexpected twists and turns. And in all of these dynamic processes,
every experiment, every word, every note, every step counts.
148. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, LIBERTY AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC STATE: ON THE
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY SOURCES OF AMERICAN DISTRUST, in DEMOCRACY AND
TRUST (ed. Mark E. Warren, 1999) (describing how Northeastern liberals were ready to
"give the vote" to the disenfranchised but then found means to undermine their ability to
exercise that vote); see also AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, 137 (1981) (describing how some advocates for women's
suffrage actually were motivated by the desire to expand the Anglo-Saxon Protestant vote
in order to reduce the voting power of Black men in the South and naturalized immigrant
men in the North); Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress and the Court:
Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the State
Action Syllogism, A BrieffHistorical Review, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381 (2009).
149. See generally Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on
Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1143 (2009).
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